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COMMENTARY:CONVERGENCESAND
DIVERGENCES: THE UNITED STATES AND
FRANCE IN MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY
Andre Lewin•

Despite the divergences that have regularly separated the United States and
France, or at the very least their officials-who unfortunately influence public opinion
as well-there are, in my opinion, more similarities than differences than one would
believe between these two countries' approaches to international relations. They both
feel that they have a calling to defend the advancement of universal values in the world
in order to further humanity along the road of peace, democracy, happiness, and
justice. The United States, which can be considered a relatively new country, values
respect for human rights, free enterprise, equal opportunity for everyone, individual
freedom, religious faith, a beliefinjustice, and constitutional rights. The United States
can also be characterized by its ambivalence towards state intervention, balanced by
a feeling of national pride and that "the American way of life" is an objective worth
defending in the United States and promoting all over the world. France is aware that
it is an old country, where revolutionary ideals are mixed with a respect for tradition.
France also shares a respect for human rights, a strong belief in equality and equal
opportunity, and a belief in a political democracy with freedom to criticize the
government. Although the French criticize the state and politicians, they look to the
state for service and assistance whenever there is a problem. France and the United
States have similar objectives. Although their methods of achieving those objectives
may once have been similar-for instance the methods of the de Gaulle administration
are similar to current United States methods-today the manner in which the two
proceed in attaining these objectives places them at odds. France has become
conscious that it is no longer a superpower and has adapted its diplomatic means to that
situation.
Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the disappearance of the blocs, and the
end of the East-West conflict, the United States has unarguably emerged as the sole
world superpower. Having overcome the temptation ofisolationism, its tendency has
been to practice a unilateralist approach in which "he who is not with me is against
me." A multi-polar world is irrelevant for a nation convinced that it holds a monopoly
over good. On the opposite side of good there exists only the axis of evil and its allies,
or rather its accomplices, and one of America's priorities has become the fight against
terrorism, in which international cooperation is vital. As George W. Bush put it, "I
believe it is our duty to lead the world." 1

* Doctor in international public law of the Paris University. Former French ambassador to GuineaConakry, India, Austria, Senegal, and Gambia. Spokesman for the Secretary General of the United Nations,
and deputy director of the press and publications department of the United Nations in New York from 1972
to 1975. Director of the department of United Nations and International Organizations in the French
Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1979 to 1983. This article has been translated from the French. Unless
otherwise note, all translations are the work of Maureen Pearsall.
I. Interview by Matt Lauer with President George W. Bush, NBC "Today Show," (Aug. 30, 2004).
Cf President John F. Kennedy, Speech to the Nation (Nov. 16, 1961). President Kennedy stated:
And we must face the fact that the Unites States is neither omnipotent nor omniscient, that
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This attitude, which can easily become arrogance, is somewhat simple to carry out
in the arena ofbilateral diplomacy once one accumulates demographic weight, political
dynamism, military force, economic power, financial preponderance, cultural appeal,
and the use ofa progressively universal language. 2 However, it is within international
organizations that this policy faces obstacles because these bodies are generally
founded upon the principle of sovereign equality among states and a voting procedure
of"one state, one vote." Therefore, the United States must compromise with often
reticent, if not hostile, majorities.
During the era in which the non-aligned movement represented a real force,
refusing to choose between the two blocs, yet often acting as an ally of the USSR and
the "socialist camp," created difficulties for Western positions, especially those
supported by the United States. Henry Kissinger stated that ''the non-alignment itself
is also an alignrnent." 3 Jean Kirkpatrick, referring to the vast differences between
United States contributions to the UN budget (twenty-five percent at the time) and
those of the non-aligned countries (a good number of them contributed at the minimum
rate), declared: "Who pays the note does not get the vote.''4

we are only six percent of the world's population, that we cannot impose our will upon the
other ninety-four percent of mankind, that we cannot right every wrong or reverse each
adversity, and that therefore there cannot be an American solution to every world problem.
2. However, it has been said that military power alone cannot create enduring political power over
wide regions. In a 1999 interview, George Kennan stated:
But purely military power, even in its greatest dimensions of superiority, can produce only
short-term successes. Serving in Berlin at the height of Hitler's military successes, in 1941,
I tried to persuade friends in the government that even if Hitler should succeed in achieving
military domination over all of Europe, he would not be able to tum this into any sort of
complete and long-lasting political preeminence and I gave reasons for this conclusion. And
we were talking, then, only about Europe. Applied to the world scene, this is, of course,
even more true. I can say without hesitation that this planet is never going to be ruled from
any single political center, whatever its military power.
Interview by Richard Ullman with George Kennan, professor at Princeton University and former United
States ambassador to the U.S.S.R. and Yugoslavia, in the New York Review of Books (Aug. 12, 1999),
available at http://www.transnational.org/features/kennaninterview.html.
3. I was present when Henry Kissinger said this during an informal meeting with journalists in the UN
cafeteria after a UN debate where the United States and Western positions were severely out-voted by
completely unanimous non-aligned movement members voting in concert with Eastern bloc countries. This
happened around 1974 or 1975.
4. When I was director of the UN and international organizations department in the French foreign
ministry from 1979 to 1984, I took part at least once a year in meetings of the so-called Geneva group,
created in 1964 and chaired by the United States and the United Kingdom. In the Geneva group, the twelve
main Western contributors to the UN budget and the budget of UN specialized agencies met to discuss
financial matters. These years (the 1970s and 1980s) were crucial because a majority of the countries
making small contributions to the UN budget endorsed without discussion and adopted the quickly growing
annual budgets. Most of the big contributors to the UN budget, led by the United States delegation, wanted
to impress upon the leaders of the institutions the importance of sticking to a "zero growth" of the draft
budgets, and the Geneva group was one of the main ways to achieve this goal.
I never personally met Jean Kirkpatrick in these meetings, but the United States delegation often
quoted this saying of hers. Of course she would never have said it in public, because it would not be
popular to assume that paying the expenses would be rewarded by votes in favor of the United States
position.
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The United States does not attach much importance to multilateral diplomacy
because Washington takes the view that only a few international organizations today
are favorable to the United States. The United States marginalizes the role of the UN,
where American veto power is sufficient to block anything that could truly hamper the
United States or threaten its crucial interests. The United States has blocked any idea
of reform to the UN Security Council that would weaken its own veto privilege. One
exception to the American view that international organizations are not favorable to
the United States is NATO. The United States has tried to expand NATO's role in
peacekeeping-even involving UN peacekeeping operations-in regions that are
completely outside of the North Atlantic treaty area, for instance Afghanistan, Iraq, and
Sudan. It seems to this writer that President Theodore Roosevelt's idea of a "league
of civilized nations," expressed in his 1910 Nobel Prize speech, is not too far off from
America's hopes for today. The United States would like the UN to become-or
would like to replace the UN with-an institution that only admits democratic
countries, and from which nations of the "axis of evil" would be expelled.
In addition, the United States only needs to maintain direct or indirect control of
a few key positions-or a significant proportion of voting rights-within the few
organizations that truly matter, such as the Washington-based institutions (the World
Banlc, which has had only American presidents since 1945, and the IMF), the United
Nations Development Program (overseen for nearly four decades by American
administrators), UNICEF (which has had solely American executive directors since
1946), the World Food Program (three American executive directors out of nine), and
certain other institutions, UN-related or not.
As for France, it cannot complain about the positions it holds in multilateral
governance. Its nationals currently run the International Energy Agency, the European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the European Central Bank, the European
Patents Office, the World Trade Organization, the Organization on Security and
Cooperation in Europe, the World Customs Organization, the World Meteorological
Organization, the Universal Postal Union, and the International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia. French nationals also occupy numerous secondary positions:
three Frenchmen were general directors of the International Monetary Fund ( out of
nine), and in the past, some were at the head of the International Court of Justice, the
International Labor Organization [ILO], UNESCO, and the International Civil
Aviation Organization [ICAO], among others.
France today has, in fact, a clear understanding of the influence it has been able
to exercise in the arena of multilateral diplomacy. When France had significant power
and was the "great nation," it did not hesitate to use force to propagate revolutionary
ideals or Napoleonic ideas across the Old Continent, or to establish a vast colonial
empire.
Is France a "great power?" Even General de Gaulle did not think so in stating, "I
have only one rival and it is Tintin; we are merely the small who do not wish to be
pushed around by the great. " 5 Furthermore, the former Gaullist Prime Minister Michel

S. ANDRE MALRAUX, DESCHENES QU'ON ABAT (1971).
For an English translation, see ANDRE
MALRAUX, FELLED OAKS, CONVERSATION WITH DE GAULLE (Linda Asher, ed., Irene Clephane, trans.,
1972).
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Debrt&customarily said: "Yes, France occupies a second rank, but a second rank is still
a rank." France can no longer act alone and it recognizes that. Its vocation is not
unilateralism, nor does it have the means to act unilaterally. Its population, land area,
and GNP are average, and its military budget is one-tenth that of the United States.
However, its thinking has always been universally oriented and its international action
undertaken accordingly.
In fact, France's voice has made itself heard loud and clear-annoyingly
sometimes, but most times interestingly-by refusing to blindly follow the lines of
action mapped out by others (particularly Washington). France also tries to conceive
original proposals which distance themselves from set phrases or forceful solutions by
attempting to share France's concerns, conceptions, and solutions with its partners in
several privileged circles, including:
The European Union circle, considered and designed to be the initiator of a
strong, autonomous, and independent force in the areas of economy, foreign
policy, defense, research, social progress, and culture. At the heart of this
Europe, Paris relies greatly on the sheer force of the Franco-German couple,
regardless of what figures or political parties are leading the two countries.
Clearly, a Europe of twenty-five members today, twenty-seven or more
tomorrow, would represent an even more powerful force, in so far as it remains
consistent in its positions-which is not the case just yet. Furthermore, it is
uncertain whether France can act outside the circle of"Old Europe" (as United
States Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld qualified it with some disdain)
with the same momentum and success as it has had in the past, or at least until
there exists a new European consciousness.
The Francophone circle, with the OIF (Organisation internationale de la
Francophonie), where fifty-six countries share the French language, promote a
common culture, and to an even greater extent, foster the values of tolerance and
progress.
The circle of friendships-traditional or new-in Africa, as confirmed by the
twenty-third Africa-France Summit, which assembled in Bamako, Mali in
December 2005 and included France and almost all countries (fifty-one) on the
African continent. (However, this circle is not structured by an institution).
The circle of the Third World is traditionally defended by Paris (for instance
during 08 meetings), a position which ensures sympathy for the French among
leaders in the Southern Hemisphere, like Brazilian President Lula.
The multilateral diplomacy circle, within eighty-eight international organizations
of which France is a member. Most important is the UN, where France holds a
permanent seat on the Security Council and its voice may be heard primarily
concerning development, human rights, the "right of interference," and the
"obligation to protect" when the survival of populations is at stake due to either
humanitarian catastrophes or internal conflicts.
Finally, the global circle, because French bilateral diplomacy is active in nearly
all countries; it is one of the truly rare states to have established everywhere
embassies, permanent missions, or general consulates-278, more than the
United States (249), the United Kingdom (224), and Germany (211).

For France, culture is an integral part of its heritage. It is one of the rare countries
to have historically practiced a cultural diplomacy that contributes to its undeniable
influence around the world. Its multilateral role has not been neglected. It was in
1945, under the provisional government of de Gaulle-hardly favorable to multilateral
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institutions-when UNESCO was invited to establish its headquarters in Paris. In
1966, de Gaulle stood before UNESCO to deliver an exceptionally short speech (four
paragraphs!) in vibrant praise of the organization. Nor can it be forgotten that in 1960,
the Minister of Culture Andre Malraux gave his famous speech on protecting Nubian
temples in upper Egypt, thereby launching the first world campaign to preserve
heritage.
France has argued for an attitude towards cultural products called the "cultural
exception." The term "cultural exception" means, for the French, that cultural products
like music, films, books, and TV are not commercial goods like sugar, bananas, meat,
textiles, minerals, cars, or planes. Therefore, cultural goods should not be treated like
commercial goods, and should not be submitted to the general trend towards
globalization and liberalization. They should not be dealt with by the WTO, but rather
by UNESCO. Each country should be allowed to help its own cultural production
through subsidies to national cinema and to protect against cultural dumping from
other sources (i.e., the United States). The term "cultural exception" is not an arrogant
phrase that implies that France believes itself to be exceptional or superior. Rather,
this simply means that assets of the mind are not merchandise, that trade regulations
cannot be applied to them, and that they must therefore be treated as exceptional and
fall under UNESCO instead of the WTO. However, the United States, strengthened
by its superiority in terms of wealth and images, satellites and television, musical
releases, cinematographic production, and communication technologies would like to
liberalize trade in films, books, and music,just like agricultural and industrial products;
thus intellectual content must give way to the material instrument. Defending the
cultural exception goes hand in hand with cultural diversity and the will to promote
cultural dialogue. It is through these means that the thirst for identity, respect for the
other, the demand for tolerance, the search for solidarity, and the will for peace are best
expressed and harmonized.
The term "cultural exception" was changed to "cultural diversity," and was the
subject of the UNESCO convention on cultural diversity. On October 20, 2005, the
United States failed in its attempt at the UNESCO General Conference to block voting
on the protection of cultural content diversity and artistic expression; 148 countries
(led primarily by France and Canada) approved it, two (the United States and Israel)
voted against it, and four abstained (Australia, Honduras, Liberia, Nicaragua). Even
the micro-state of Kiribati, which abstained in commission, did not persist in its
attitude. Other large film producing and exporting countries-such as the United
Kingdom, Japan, and India-that had initially hesitated because they found the text
"ambiguous," finally adopted it.
Following a twenty-year absence, the return of the United States to UNESCO in
late 2003-an event welcomed by all-was a gesture intended to demonstrate a few
months after the launch of military operations in Iraq that the Bush administration was
not hostile towards UN-family organizations. However, the gesture did not obtain the
anticipated results. United States diplomacy was unable to prevent an overwhelming
majority from speaking out against the American position on cultural diversity. United
States representatives let it be known that Washington was now going to campaign in
the capitals of member countries in order to prevent them from ratifying the convention
in question. This method had previously been employed (with relative success) by the
United States, when it sought to prevent American soldiers from being tried as war
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criminals before the new International Criminal Court established in the Hague. The
United States violently opposed the court and voted against its creation on July 17,
1998, in Rome, along with six other delegations, while 120 countries approved it and
twency-one abstained. This was not the first time that the United States publicly
demonstrated its reticence, if not its hostility, towards those multilateral institutions in
which it had failed to gain acceptance for its positions or had been regularly defeated.
Let us also recall the failure of President Woodrow Wilson, the inspirational force
behind the League ofNations, who on March 19, 1920, despite numerous concessions,
was unable to obtain the necessary two-thirds majority in the Senate for the Treaty of
Versailles, which contained the Covenant of the League ofNations. The absence of
the United States from this precursor to the UN was largely to blame for its failure.
Fortunately, President Roosevelt, and later President Truman, did not face the same
obstacles, and on August 8, 1945, the United States ratified the UN Charter, a text also
greatly inspired by American views.
Several times over the past sixty years, there have been campaigns for the United
States to withdraw from the UN or for the UN Secretariat to be removed from New
York. As such, in the 1970s, the slogan, ''the U.S. out of the UN, the UN out of the
U.S.," could often be heard, to which this author was a witness, having been in New
York at the time as spokesman for the Secretary General. More recently, following the
launch of the war in Iraq in 2003 without UN approval, neo-conservative circles, such
as the Conservative Caucus, called for American withdrawal from an organization
which some already deemed to be "dead." However, in the end, the United States did
not withdraw: something only Indonesia under President Soekarno had done for a few
months in 1965-1966. Colonel Khadafi, during his most exuberant period, threatened
to leave the UN and promote a new RUN (Revolutionary United Nations), but never
did. However, we should remember that France in December 1945 voted against the
proposal to establish UN headquarters in the United States (the United States
abstained). The following year, in December 1946, France abstained from voting on
the organization's establishment in New York. Some argue that Paris feared that the
presence of a large Jewish community in the city would influence the impartiality of
debates concerning Palestine.
It should also be noted that the United States withdrew from the International
Labor Organization in 1977 under the Carter administration, before returning in 1980.
Similarly, the Reagan administration decided to withdraw from UNESCO in 1984 (as
did Margaret Thatcher's United Kingdom) to demonstrate opposition to the
organization's management under it director general, Moktar Mbow from Senegal.
Their withdrawal was also motivated by fierce objections to the New World
Information and Communication Order, a plan since buried, because they perceived
therein a threat to the freedom of information circulation. Yet, the United States
returned to UNESCO in 2003, a positive gesture by the Bush administration,
undoubtedly to compensate for the very negative attitude towards the UN over the
conflict in Iraq. Since then, attacks have been targeted less against the UN than against
Secretary General Kofi Annan, particularly regarding the poor management of the
"Food for Oil" program. However, documents concerning the program could have
been examined by all Security Council members-permanent or not. In addition,
Secretary General Annan himself, in March 200 l, warned staff and member-countries
of rumors of misconduct of these operations due to kickbacks requested by some Iraqi

HeinOnline -- 58 Me. L. Rev. 400 2006

2006]

CONVERGENCES AND DIVERGENCES

401

officials. Finally, the United States withdrew in 1995 from UNIDO (United Nations
Industrial Development Organization, established in Vienna).
The Iraqi conflict gave rise, in early 2003, to a Franco-American confrontation
within the Security Council. The spectacular one-on-one debate between Colin Ppwell
and Dominique de Villepin will not soon be forgotten. At the time, the United States
had realized that it would not be able to gain the necessary nine-vote majority for the
mandate to launch military operations-which would have been blocked anyway by
a French, Russian, or Chinese veto. There had already been the Gulf War, led by a
coalition ofintemational forces under U.S. command to liberate Kuwait in 1990, which
was not a UN operation; however, it had been authorized by the Security Council
because it entailed liberating a member country. Similarly, thirteen Korean War
contingents-one of which was French-were placed under U.S. command in 1950 by
a formal Security Council mandate.6 This "UN Command in Korea" is still there
today, although its ties to the UN are more theoretical than real, and its commander has
always been an American general.
However, the United States has not hesitated on several occasions to withdraw
from international operations when it felt that its national interests were being
threatened. For example, the United States did not hesitate to withdraw troops placed
at the disposal of a UN peacekeeping and humanitarian operation in Somalia in
October 1993, when a group of eighteen Marines was killed, and the body of one of
them profaned in front of CNN cameras. The United States withdrawal led to the end
of this predominantly humanitarian operation. It was the American "Zero Dead"
doctrine throughout the Somali operation that led Washington thereafter to take a very
restrictive stance when placing soldiers at the disposal of the UN (even in Liberia, for
example, where United States participation would have otherwise been valuable). In
addition, the United States gave priority to air operations (as in the former
Yugoslavia), leaving the responsibility of ground operations to French, English,
Canadian, Dutch, and other troops.
Finally, the United States has been known, on several occasions, to exert
enormous pressure on UN-family organizations to force them to make administrative
reforms and institute drastic budget cuts. In the 1980s, it successfully pushed the
Geneva group (comprising the twelve greatest contributing countries to the UN and
specialized agency budgets) to accept "zero growth" for their budgets.
More recently, the United States, facing pressure particularly from Congress,
blocked for several years the payment of significant contributions (more than 1 billion
dollars worth) to the UN budget, notably to the peacekeeping operations budget. It
also negotiated the reduction of its quota from twenty-five percent to twenty-two
percent for the regular budget (it is slightly higher for the peacekeeping operations
budget).
After having used its veto to prevent the re-election of Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the
United States engaged in excellent relations with his successor, Kofi Annan, during his
first term, but these have significantly deteriorated after he proclaimed the war in Iraq
to be illegal according to UN criteria. Thereafter, the campaign against him began,
along with demands for detailed reform to the secretariat's management.

6. UN peacekeeping forces were not "invented" until 1956.
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However, France, while hardly suspected of harboring hostility to multilateral
diplomacy, has over recent decades reacted rigidly at times, and not only, as one would
believe, during the era of General de Gaulle. We cannot forget, for example, that in
August 1954, France dealt a harsh blow to European unity when it rejected, by
parliamentary vote, the treaty on the European Defense Community, even though
France had been its initiator. As a result, the creation of such a community suffered
a setback that has yet to be rectified even today. Similarly, in May 2005, another
warning shot was fired by France at European construction when it rejected the
European draft constitution by referendum (the Netherlands did the same a few days
later).
During his presidency, Charles de Gaulle vetoed both the United Kingdom's entry
into the European Economic Community in 1963 and in 1967. However, France
considered these vetoes to have political justification. France thought the United
Kingdom was not genuinely "European" and was more inclined to Atlantic sympathies.
Churchill himself several times distinguished the United Kingdom from Europe. 7 In
fact, France suffered after the United Kingdom became a member of the EEC. On a
number of matters, whether under Margaret Thatcher or under Tony Blair, the
positions of the United Kingdom have been clearly closer to American positions than
to positions of the majority of European Union member states.
From July 1965 to January 1966, the French practice of the "empty chair" and its
refusal to participate in Brussels' community affairs also represented forceful
demonstrations tied to defending national interests. This was because de Gaulle
opposed the transition from unanimous voting to majority voting within the European
Council of Ministers (a crisis resolved by the "Luxemburg Compromise" allowing a
member State to block a decision should it deem that ''very important interests" are at
stake). The practice of the "empty chair," which France has practiced in Brussels and
in the UN, is that no French delegation is present in the room and the chair remains
without a delegate; only the French name plate is present. This technique pressured
the EEC into siding with France. France's absence paralyzed the EEC, because it
needed a unanimous vote to proceed. Notwithstanding its status as one of the oldest
and greatest countries in Europe, France could not forego its opposition, which it may
have had to do ifit had been a less powerful and assertive country. Even today, with
regard to the EU's Common Agricultural Policy, which benefits French agriculture,
France is highly opposed, for fear of isolation, to a decrease in agricultural subsidies
as proposed by the European Commission to the WTO.
In May I 965, France withdrew from SEATO (the South-East Asia Treaty
Organization). In a similar fashion, in March of the following year, France announced
its departure from NATO military institutions, thereby forcing the organization to
move its headquarters from Paris to Brussels. Although highly criticized by the United
States, this decision did not prevent France from remaining a member of the Atlantic
Pact, cooperating with NATO (even militarily, as witnessed in the former Yugoslavia
and today in Afghanistan), and demonstrating solidarity when United States security
was at stake. For example, during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, de Gaulle had no

7. This writer heard Churchill distinguish the United Kingdom from Europe when he was a small boy
visiting Switzerland with his parents and heard Churchill give a speech in Zurich.
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desire to examine photographic evidence of the presence of Soviet missiles that had
been sent to him by President Kennedy, stating that he trusted his word. However,
could the same be said today? Yes. Such solidarity was apparent following the World
Trade Center attacks on September 11, 200 I.
France has also shown a certain reserve at times towards the UN. In the 1950s,
its seat remained empty during the debates on Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria. France
was denounced, alongside the United Kingdom and Israel, during the Suez crisis in
October 1956 (Paris therefore made use, with London, of its veto right), and later
during its nuclear testing in the Sahara and the Pacific. France also refused to
participate in UN work on disarmament and hesitated for a long time before signing
the non-proliferation treaties.
In 1960, General de Gaulle treated the UN as a nameless "thingy," and refused to
deal with Secretary General Dag Hamrnarskjoeld (even though he had been nominated
by France for the position of Secretary General) particularly during the Bizerte crisis
with Tunisia in 1961. He also refused to visit UN headquarters during one of his stays
in the United States-preferring instead to receive the Secretary General at his New
York hotel. Finally, de Gaulle demonstrated his opposition to UN intervention in the
former Belgian Congo (the future Zaire and Democratic Republic of the Congo). De
Gaulle refused to pay France's contribution towards financing these operations, in
violation of an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice. This refusal
happened despite the United States' threat to implement Article 19 of the Charter,
which would deprive France of its veto right-an interesting paradox in light of what
happened to the United States forty years later. However, it was at the height of this
controversial period with the UN, in 1963, that de Gaulle made a remarkable gesture
in deciding to devote 0.5 percent of the French military budget towards the
creation-under the aegis of the WHO-of an international cancer research center,
which was established two years later in Lyon.
Relations between France and the UN greatly improved under Secretary General
U Thant of Burma, whom General de Gaulle welcomed in Paris on several occasions,
describing the UN as a ''useful forum" and hoping to infuse the organization with a
new lease on life by consulting with the five large founding countries. Valery Giscard
d'Estaing spoke before the UN in 1978 and announced a stark change in attitude
towards the problem of disarmament, but he was not the first French head of state to
speak at the UN. In 1948 and 1951, Vincent Auriol opened the third and sixth sessions
held in Paris. Auriol also visited the UN during an official trip to the United States in
1951, but did not deliver a speech because the Assembly was out of session. His
successors Rene Coty, Charles de Gaulle, and Georges Pompidou did not pay any
visits to the UN. Also during 1978, Valery Giscard d'Estaing sent a strong French
military contingent to southern Lebanon (the first such action since sending observers
to the Middle East in 1948 and the French battalion during the Korean War in 1950).
Since then, France has always been among the main contributing countries to UN
peacekeeping forces. Valery Giscard d'Estaing's successors, Fran~ois Mitterrand and
presently Jacques Chirac, could also be considered staunch supporters of the UN. On
the United States side, every president without fail has come year after year to speak
at the opening session of each General Assembly, traditionally taking the floor on the
first day.
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It is also interesting to compare the United States' and France's use of the veto
within the Security Council. Up until late 2004, it was used eighteen times by France
(in particular, during 1976 to defend a national interest regarding sovereign rights in
the Comoros, and for the last time, in 1989). On the other hand, the United States has
used it more than eighty times, primarily since the end of the Cold War and most often
concerning the Near East in order to protect Israel from condemnation. Among the
previous U.S. vetoes are those (with the support of other Western countries) seeking
to protect South Africa from economic and military sanctions during the period of
apartheid, and in 1973 the first unilateral veto which blocked the adoption of a
resolution demanding the opening of negotiations on the status of the Panama canal.
By comparison, the USSR has the record for the most vetoes, with 113 in total, and
three for Russia since 1991. The United Kingdom has thirty and China has six.
Another interesting element is that in selecting their ambassadors and permanent
representatives to the UN in New York, the United States has chosen four professional
State Department diplomats out of twenty-five office-holders (the other incumbents
being political appointees or politicians), whereas France had only four political
appointees, against fifteen foreign office diplomats.
One similarity between France and the United States is their respective
relationships with the International Court of Justice. Although both countries are firm
partisans of peace through law, both have limited the compulsory jurisdiction of the
ICJ. France had accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ in 1947, but in 1966
limited jurisdiction in cases concerning national defense and nuclear policy. France
denounced jurisdiction completely in 1974 for national security reasons. The United
States decided in 1985 to withdraw its consent to the compulsory jurisdiction of the
ICJ, on the occasion of the complaint against it by Nicaragua concerning U.S. military
and paramilitary activities.
Multilateral diplomacy, which was born after World War I and tends to take
precedence over classic bilateral diplomacy, is a new mode in international relations.
In fact, the majority of new states having acquired independence since the 1950s do
not have the administrative, personal, or financial means to maintain diplomatic
relations with a large number of partners. Their effective participation in international
community life depends on their membership in international organizations, the most
important of which is the UN.
However, the larger states themselves cannot ignore the benefits arising from
multilateral diplomacy in their international role as well. The examples of the United
States, the sole superpower, and France, a country with more modest means,
demonstrate that the manner in which multilateral diplomacy is used can vary greatly
given the circumstances. While marginal for the United States, it is essential for
France. France feels more at ease in the multilateral context than the United States; its
positions and means of proceeding are better accepted there because they are more
consensual and are imbued with a universalism deriving from the French way of
looking at the world.
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